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Abstract 
Economic research offers two traditional ways of analyzing decision making under risk. 
One option is to compare the goodness of fit of different decision theories using the same 
model of stochastic choice. An alternative way is to vary models of stochastic choice 
combining them with only one or two decision theories. This paper proposes to look at 
the bigger picture by comparing different combinations of decision theories and models 
of stochastic choice. We select a menu of seven popular decision theories and embed 
each theory in five models of stochastic choice including tremble, Fechner and random 
utility model. We find that the estimated parameters of decision theories differ 
significantly when theories are combined with different models. Depending on the 
selected model of stochastic choice we obtain different ranking of decision theories with 
regard to their goodness of fit to the data. The fit of all analyzed decision theories 
improves significantly when they are embedded in a Fechner model of heteroscedastic 
truncated errors (or random utility model in a dynamic decision problem). 
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Models of Stochastic Choice and Decision Theories: 
Why Both are Important for Analyzing Decisions 
Experimental studies on repeated decision making under risk find that individuals 
often do not choose the same alternative when they are faced with identical binary choice 
problem repeated within a short period of time. For instance, Camerer (1989) reports that 
31.6% of subjects reverse their initial decision on the second repetition of a choice task. 
Starmer and Sugden (1989) observe a switching rate of 26.5%. Hey and Orme (1994) find 
that 25% of repeated decisions are inconsistent, even when individuals are allowed to de-
clare indifference. Ballinger and Wilcox (1997) report a median switching rate of 20.8%. 
An overwhelming majority of decision theories are deterministic i.e. they predict 
that an individual makes identical choices if a decision problem is repeated, unless she is 
exactly indifferent. Such a decision theory is typically embedded into a model of 
stochastic choice, when there is a need to relate a deterministic theory to stochastic data. 
Stochastic data can be either individual choice patterns from repeated decision making 
(e.g. Hey and Orme, 1994) or aggregate choice patterns from unrepeated decision making 
(e.g. Harless and Camerer, 1994). Thus, a model of stochastic choice serves as an 
intermediary, which translates a deterministic prediction of decision theories in a stochas-
tic choice pattern that can be estimated by econometric methods on empirical data. 
Much of empirical research on decision making under risk focuses on comparing 
numerous decision theories according to their goodness of fit to the behavioral patterns 
observed in the laboratory experiments. A researcher typically selects one model of 
stochastic choice and estimates several decision theories all embedded into this model. 
For example, Harless and Camerer (1994) estimate decision theories embedded in a 
tremble model and Hey and Orme (1994) estimate decision theories embedded in a 
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Fechner model of homoscedastic random errors. A far less common procedure is to select 
one or two decision theories and to estimate them in conjunction with several models of 
stochastic choices (e.g. Carbone, 1997; Loomes et al., 2002). As Hey (2005) points out, 
the selection of a model of stochastic choice is generally considered to be of secondary 
importance with far more emphasis put on the selection of a decision theory. However, 
Buschena and Zilberman (2000) and Blavatskyy (2007) show that conclusions drawn 
from the estimation of decision theories embedded in one model of stochastic choice do 
not necessarily hold if theories are estimated with different models of stochastic choice.  
In this paper we do not estimate several decision theories all embedded in one 
model of stochastic choice or just one decision theory embedded in several models of 
stochastic choice. To look at the big picture, we estimate seven popular decision theories 
each embedded in five models of stochastic choice that were proposed in the literature. In 
addition, we do not run a conventional laboratory experiment. Instead, we use data from a 
natural experiment, where representatives of a large fraction of the adult population 
choose between a risky lottery with large monetary stakes and an amount for certain.  
Our main findings are as follows. Estimates of decision theories vary significantly 
when theories are embedded in different models of stochastic choice. In a static decision 
problem, the model that provides the best description of the data is a Fechner model of 
heteroscedastic truncated errors. In a dynamic decision problem, the performance of a 
Fechner model of heteroscedastic truncated errors is tied with a random utility model. 
The fit of a decision theory varies dependent on the model of stochastic choice. Across all 
models, the best explanation of the data is provided by either expected utility theory with 
expo-power utility function or rank-dependent expected utility theory. The theory with the 
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worst fit (risk neutrality) combined with the best performing model of stochastic choice 
generally is at least as good as the best performing theory embedded in any other model.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Models of stochastic choice 
are described in section 1 and decision theories are described in section 2. Section 3 
presents the data from a natural experiment. Section 4 compares maximum likelihood 
estimates of each theory embedded in each model and their goodness of fit. Section 5 
concludes. 
1. Models of Stochastic Choice 
1.1. Tremble model 
Harless and Camerer (1994) argue that individuals generally choose among 
lotteries according to a deterministic decision theory, but there is a constant probability 
that this deterministic choice pattern reverses (as a result of pure tremble). Let θ  be a 
vector of parameters that characterize the parametric form of a decision theory and let 
( )θ,Lu  denote utility of a lottery L  according to this theory. In this paper we consider 
only binary choices between a risky lottery and a degenerate lottery that delivers one 
monetary outcome with probability one. According to Harless and Camerer (1994), the 
log-likelihood of observing N decisions, when individuals choose a risky lottery iL , 
{ }Ni ,...,1∈ , over a monetary amount iO  for certain, can be written as 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
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and the log-likelihood of observing M decisions, when individuals choose a monetary 
amount iO , { }Mi ,...,1∈ ,  for certain over a risky lottery iL ,  can be written as 
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where ( )xI  is an indicator function i.e. ( ) 1=xI  if x is true and ( ) 0=xI  if x is false, and 
( )1,0∈p  is probability of a tremble. Notice that a tremble occurs when the utility of a 
risky lottery is less than the utility of a sure amount but an individual chooses the risky 
lottery nonetheless; or when the risky lottery yields higher utility but an individual 
chooses the sure amount. Parameters θ  and p  are estimated to maximize log-likelihood 
AR LLLL + . 
1.2. Fechner Model of Homoscedastic Random Errors 
Hey and Orme (1994) estimate a Fechner model of random errors, where a 
random error distorts the net advantage of one lottery over another (in terms of utility). 
Net advantage is calculated according to underlying deterministic decision theory. The 
error term is a normally distributed random variable with zero mean and constant 
standard deviation. According to Hey and Orme (1994), the log-likelihood of observing N 
decisions, when individuals choose a risky lottery iL , { }Ni ,...,1∈ , over a monetary 
amount iO  for certain, can be written as 
( ) ( )[ ]( )∑
=
−Φ=
N
i
iiR OuLuLL
1
,0 ,,log θθσ , 
and the log-likelihood of observing M decisions, when individuals choose a monetary 
amount iO , { }Mi ,...,1∈ ,  for certain over a risky lottery iL ,  can be written as 
( ) ( )[ ]( )∑
=
−Φ−=
M
i
iiA OuLuLL
1
,0 ,,1log θθσ , 
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where [ ].,0 σΦ  is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of a normal distribution with 
zero mean and standard deviation σ . Parameters θ  and σ  are estimated to maximize 
combined log-likelihood AR LLLL + . 
1.3. Fechner Model of Heteroscedastic Random Errors 
Hey (1995) and Buschena and Zilberman (2000) extend a Fechner model of 
random errors by assuming that the error term is heteroscedastic, i.e. the standard 
deviation of errors is higher in certain decision problems, for example, when lotteries 
have many possible outcomes. Blavatskyy (2007) argues that individuals, who face risky 
lotteries with a smaller range of possible outcomes, have a lower volatility of random 
errors than individuals, who face risky lotteries with a wider range of possible outcomes. 
For example, an individual facing 50%-50% chance of €1 and €5 is likely to have a 
smaller variance of random errors than an individual facing 50%-50% chance of €1 and 
€500 000. We will estimate a Fechner model of random errors when the standard 
deviation of random errors is proportionate to the difference between the utility of the 
highest outcome x  and the utility of the lowest outcome x  of a risky lottery L. 
Specifically, the log-likelihood of observing N decisions, when individuals choose a risky 
lottery iL , { }Ni ,...,1∈ , over a monetary amount iO  for certain, can be written as 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]( )∑
=
−⋅ −Φ=
N
i
iixuxuR OuLuLL ii
1
,,,0 ,,log θθθθσ , 
and the log-likelihood of observing M decisions, when individuals choose a monetary 
amount iO , { }Mi ,...,1∈ ,  for certain over a risky lottery iL ,  can be written as 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]( )∑
=
−⋅ −Φ−=
M
i
iixuxuA OuLuLL ii
1
,,,0 ,,1log θθθθσ . 
As usual, parameters θ  and σ  are estimated to maximize total log-likelihood AR LLLL + . 
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1.4. Fechner Model of Heteroscedastic and Truncated 
Random Errors 
Blavatskyy (2007) extends a Fechner model of heteroscedastic errors by 
truncating the distribution of random errors so that an individual does not commit 
transparent errors. An example of such transparent error is the situation when an 
individual values a risky lottery more than its highest possible outcome for certain or 
when an individual values a risky lottery less than its lowest possible outcome for certain 
(known as a violation of the internality axiom).  
In a binary choice between a risky lottery and a monetary amount for certain, a 
rational individual would always reject the amount, which is smaller than the lowest 
possible outcome of the risky lottery. Similarly, the individual would always accept an 
amount, which exceeds the highest possible outcomes of the risky lottery. However, 
according to a Fechner model presented in sections 1.2 and 1.3 there is a strictly positive 
probability that a decision maker commits such transparent error.  
To disregard such transparent errors, the distribution of heteroscedastic Fechner 
errors is truncated from above and from below. Specifically, the log-likelihood of 
observing N decisions, when individuals choose a risky lottery iL , { }Ni ,...,1∈ , over a 
monetary amount [ ]iii xxO ,∈  for certain, can be written as 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]
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and the log-likelihood of observing M decisions, when individuals choose a monetary 
amount [ ]iii xxO ,∈ , { }Mi ,...,1∈ ,  for certain over a risky lottery iL ,  can be written as 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]
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Notice that when a sure monetary amount is exactly equal to the lowest (highest) possible 
outcome of a risky lottery, an individual chooses the risky lottery with probability one 
(zero) and she chooses the sure amount with probability zero (one). As usual, parameters 
θ  and σ  are estimated to maximize combined log-likelihood AR LLLL + . 
1.5. Random Utility Model 
Loomes and Sugden (1995) argue that individual preferences over lotteries are 
stochastic and can be represented by a random utility model. Individual preferences over 
lotteries are captured by a decision theory with a parametric form that is characterized by 
a vector of parameters θ . We will assume that one of the parameters θ∈Rθ  is normally 
distributed with mean μ  and standard deviation σ  and the remaining parameters R−θ  
are non-stochastic.1 Let ( )RR −θθ  denote the value of parameter Rθ  such that given other 
parameters R−θ , an individual is exactly indifferent between a monetary amount O for 
certain and a risky lottery L i.e. ( )[ ]( ) ( )[ ]( )RRRRRR OuLu −−−− = θθθθ ,,,, θθ . Without a loss 
of generality, we can assume that for all parameter values above this threshold, i.e. 
( )RRR −> θθθ , an individual prefers the sure amount over the risky lottery (otherwise we 
can always define a new parameter RR θθ −=∗ ).  
The log-likelihood of observing N decisions, when individuals choose a risky 
lottery iL , { }Ni ,...,1∈ , over a monetary amount iO  for certain, can be then written as 
( )[ ]( )∑
=
−Φ=
N
i
RRRLL
1
,log θθσμ , 
                                                 
1 We do not assume that all parameters in vector θ  are jointly normally distributed because maximum 
likelihood estimation of such (non-linear) model requires numerical integration, which significant impacts 
the speed of computations. Even with only one stochastic parameter, the estimation of rank-dependent 
expected utility and disappointment aversion theory embedded into a random utility model took as long as 
two month on Pentium 4 3.0 GHz CPU. 
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and the log-likelihood of observing M decisions, when individuals choose a monetary 
amount iO , { }Mi ,...,1∈ ,  for certain over a risky lottery iL ,  can be written as 
( )[ ]( )∑
=
−Φ−=
M
i
RRALL
1
,1log θθσμ , 
Notice that the probability that an individual chooses a risky lottery over a monetary 
amount is simply the probability of observing preferences characterized by parameter 
( )RRR −< θθθ . Similarly, the likelihood that an individual chooses the sure amount is just 
the likelihood of observing parameter ( )RRR −> θθθ . Parameters R−θ , μ  and σ  are 
estimated to maximize total log-likelihood AR LLLL + . 
1.6. Luce Choice Model (Strict Utility Model) 
Luce (1959) proposes a stochastic choice model (known as strict utility model) 
where the probability that a risky lottery L  is chosen over a monetary amount O  for 
certain can be written as ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]μμμ 111 ,,, θθθ OuLuLu + , where 0>μ  is a noise 
parameter. This model has been recently popularized by Holt and Laury (2002). It is 
well-known (e.g. Theorem 30 in Luce and Suppes, 1965) that Luce choice model can be 
rewritten as a Fechner model of homoscedastic random errors so that the probability that 
a risky lottery L  is chosen over amount O  for certain is given by ( ) ( )[ ]θθ ,~,~ OuLu −Λμ , 
where [ ] ( )( )μμ xx −+=Λ exp11  is the cdf of the logistic distribution and ( ) ( ).log.~ uu = . 
Notice that in this model utility scale is determined up to a multiplication by a 
positive constant (Luce and Suppes, 1965, p 335). All decision theories that we consider 
in section 2 except for risk neutrality and Yaari’s dual model (which do not have utility 
function) employ utility functions that are unique up to affine transformation i.e. if utility 
function ( ).u  represents individual preferences then utility function ( ) ( ) bauu +=′ ..  
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represents the same preferences for any 0>a  and any b. A decision theory with utility 
function which is determined up to affine transformation cannot be estimated in 
conjunction with Luce choice model. If we estimate such decision theory with utility 
function ( ).u  embedded in Luce choice model, we receive different results compared to 
the estimation of the same decision theory with utility function ( ) ( ) bauu +=′ .. , ,0>a  
0≠b . In other words, arbitrary normalization of utility function (in particular, a shift in 
the utility scale by a constant 0≠b ) affects the estimated parameters of decision theory. 
Therefore, we do not estimate decision theories embedded in Luce choice model. 
2. Decision Theories 
In contrast to the small number of models of stochastic choice, the number of 
decision theories reaches well into double-digit figures (Starmer, 2000). In this paper we 
selected only those decision theories that have a parsimonious parametric form. 
Specifically, we require that the number of parameters in every decision theory does not 
exceed two. Nearly all popular decision theories fulfill this requirement and they are 
briefly described below. However, inevitably, some decision theories are left out. In 
particular, we do not estimate weighted utility theory (e.g. Chew and McCrimmon, 1979; 
Chew, 1983) and (cumulative) prospect theory (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).  
2.1. Risk Neutrality (RN) 
Risk neutrality is the simplest decision theory. A risk neutral individual always 
prefers the lottery with the highest expected value of possible outcomes. Formally, under 
risk neutrality, the utility of a risky lottery ( )nn pxpxL ,;...;, 11  that delivers outcome ix  
with probability ip , { }ni ,...,1∈ ,  is given by ∑ =ni ii xp1 . There are no free parameters to 
be estimated for this decision theory, i.e. vector θ  is the empty set. 
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2.2. Expected Utility Theory (EUT) 
According to expected utility theory, an individual evaluates monetary outcomes 
by means of a subjective utility function and chooses the lottery with the highest expected 
utility of possible outcomes. Formally, the utility of lottery ( )nn pxpxL ,;...;, 11  is given 
by  ( )∑
=
n
i
ii xup
1
, where RR: →u  is a (Bernoulli) utility function over money. We will 
estimate expected utility theory with two utility functions: constant relative risk aversion 
(CRRA) and expo-power (EP). CRRA utility function is given by ( ) ( )rxxu r −= − 11 , 
when 1≠r ,  and ( ) ( )xxu log= , when 1=r . Notice that an individual with CRRA utility 
function is risk-seeking when 0<r  and risk-averse when 0>r . When we restrict 0=r , 
EUT with CRRA utility function coincides with RN. For EUT with CRRA utility 
function, vector θ  consists only of one element—a coefficient of relative risk aversion r . 
EP utility function is given by ( ) ( )α
α rx rexu
−⋅− −−=
111 , where 0≠α . When 0=r , 
EP utility function exhibits a constant coefficient of absolute risk aversion e.g. 
( ) ( ) α=′′′− xuxu . In the limiting case when 0→α , EP utility function exhibits a 
constant coefficient of relative risk aversion i.e. ( )( ) rxu
xux =′
′′−→0limα . However, since EP 
utility function is not defined when 0=α , it does not nest EUT with CRRA utility 
function or RN as special cases. For EUT with EP utility function, vector θ  is given by 
[ ]α,r=θ . When estimating EUT with EP utility function embedded into a random utility 
model, we assume that coefficient r  is stochastic and coefficient α  is deterministic. 
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2.3. Regret Theory (RT) and Skew-Symmetric Bilinear 
Utility Theory (SSB) 
According to skew-symmetric bilinear utility theory (e.g. Fishburn, 1983), an 
individual chooses a risky lottery ( )nn pxpxL ,;...;, 11  over a sure monetary amount O  if 
( ) ( ) 0,,
1
≥≡Ψ ∑
=
n
i
ii OxpOL ψ , where RRR: →×ψ  is a skew-symmetric function i.e. 
( ) ( )xOOx ,, ψψ −= . SSB coincides with regret theory (e.g. Loomes et al., 1992) if ( )⋅⋅,ψ  
is convex (the assumption of regret aversion). We will estimate RT (SSB) with function  
( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ <−−−−
≥−−−= −−
−−
OxrxrO
OxrOrxOx
rr
rr
,11
,11,
11
11
δ
δ
ψ  
for 0,1 >≠ δr  and function 
( ) ( )( )( )( )⎩⎨
⎧
<−
≥=
OxxO
OxOxOx
,log
,log, δ
δ
ψ  
for 0,1 >= δr . This function satisfies the assumption of regret aversion when 1>δ . 
When we restrict 1=δ , RT (SSB) coincides with EUT with CRRA utility 
function. Interestingly, when we restrict 0=r , RT (SSB) becomes a restricted version of 
(cumulative) prospect theory (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) with a reference point 
equal to a sure monetary amount,2 no loss aversion3 and a linear probability weighting 
function. Finally, when we restrict 1=δ  and 0=r , RT (SSB)  coincides with RN.  
Log-likelihood functions for RT (SSB) embedded into different models of 
stochastic choice are the same as the log-likelihood functions described in section 1 if we 
replace ( ) ( )θθ ,, ii OuLu −  with ( )θ,, ii OLΨ  and ( ) ( )θθ ,, ii xuxu −  with ( )θ,, ii xxψ . For 
                                                 
2 Post et al. (2006) argue that a sure monetary amount is a “natural” reference point in binary choice 
problems where an individual has to decide between a risky lottery and an amount for certain. 
3 Blavatskyy and Pogrebna (2006) find no evidence of loss aversion in the Italian and British versions of 
Deal or No Deal based on a non-parametric between-subject test.  
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RT (SSB), parameter vector θ  has two elements: [ ]δ,r=θ . When estimating RT (SSB) 
embedded into a random utility model, we assume that coefficient r  is stochastic and 
coefficient δ  is deterministic. 
2.4. Yaari’s Dual Model (YDM) 
According to Yaari’s dual model, the utility of a risky lottery ( )nn pxpxL ,;...;, 11 , 
nxxx >>> ...21 , is given by ∑ ∑∑
=
−
==
⋅⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛n
i
i
i
j
j
i
j
j xpwpw
1
1
11
, where [ ] [ ]1,01,0: →w  is 
a probability weighting function (e.g. Yaari, 1987). The probability weighting function is 
strictly increasing and ( ) 00 =w , ( ) 11 =w . We will estimate Yaari’s dual model with 
probability weighting function ( ) ( )( ) γγγγ 11 ppppw −+= . Notice that when 1<γ , this 
probability weighing function has a typical inverse S-shape i.e. small probabilities 
( 31<p ) of extreme outcomes are overweighted and medium and large probabilities 
( 31>p ) are underweighted (compared to their objective values). When 1>γ , the 
probability weighting function has atypical S-shape and small probabilities of extreme 
outcomes are underweighted and medium and large probabilities are overweighted. When 
we restrict 1=γ , YDM coincides with RN. For YDM, the vector θ  consists only of one 
element—the coefficient of the probability weighting functionγ . 
2.5. Rank-Dependent Expected Utility Theory (RDEU) 
According to rank-dependent expected utility theory, the utility of a risky lottery 
( )nn pxpxL ,;...;, 11 , nxxx >>> ...21 , is given by ( )∑ ∑∑
=
−
==
⋅⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛n
i
i
i
j
j
i
j
j xupwpw
1
1
11
, 
where [ ] [ ]1,01,0: →w  is a probability weighting function and RR: →u  is utility 
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function (e.g. Quiggin, 1981). If all lottery outcomes nxxx >>> ...21  are above the 
reference point of an individual, the prediction of RDEU is identical to the prediction of 
cumulative prospect theory (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). We will estimate RDEU 
with the probability weighting function ( ) ( )( ) γγγγ 11 ppppw −+=  and CRRA utility 
function ( ) ( )rxxu r −= − 11 , when 1≠r ,  and ( ) ( )xxu log= , when 1=r .4  
When we restrict 1=γ , RDEU coincides with EUT with CRRA utility function. 
When we restrict 0=r , RDEU coincides with YDM. Finally, when we restrict 1=γ  and 
0=r , RDEU coincides with RN (a total of two restrictions). For RDEU, vector θ  has 
two elements: [ ]γ,r=θ . When estimating RDEU embedded into a random utility model, 
we assume that coefficient r  is stochastic and coefficient γ  is deterministic. 
2.6. Disappointment Aversion Theory (DAT) 
According to disappointment aversion theory, an individual experiences 
disappointment (elation) when a realized outcome of a lottery is below (above) its 
certainty equivalent. Ex ante, an individual anticipates future disappointment or elation 
and attempts to minimize ex post disappointment (e.g. Gul, 1991). Formally, the utility of 
a risky lottery ( )nn pxpxL ,;...;, 11 , nxxx >>> ...21 , is (implicitly) defined by  
( ) ( )∑∑∑∑ +−=
+−=
−
=
+−=
+
++
+
n
mni
iin
mni
i
mn
i
iin
mni
i
xup
p
xup
p 1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
β
β
β
, where { }1,...,1 −∈ nm  is a number 
of disappointing outcomes in lottery L  and 1−>β  is a subjective parameter that captures 
disappointment preferences (positive values of β  indicate disappointment aversion).  
                                                 
4 Notice that RDEU is often estimated with power utility function ( ) αxxu = . By setting r−= 1α  we 
can immediately relate our estimates of coefficient r  to the estimates of power coefficient α , that are 
often reported in other studies. 
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We estimate DAT with CRRA utility function ( ) ( )rxxu r −= − 11 , when 1≠r ,  
and ( ) ( )xxu log= , when 1=r . When we restrict 0=β , DAT becomes EUT with CRRA 
utility function. When we restrict 0=β  and 0=r , DAT coincides with RN. For DAT, 
vector [ ]β,r=θ . When estimating DAT embedded into a random utility model, we 
assume that coefficient r  is stochastic and coefficient β  is deterministic. 
3. Data 
We use data from a natural experiment provided by the television show Deal or 
No Deal. In this show, monetary prizes ranging from one cent to half-a-million are 
randomly allocated across identical boxes. The list of potential prizes is common 
knowledge but their allocation across boxes is kept secret. A contestant is endowed with 
one box and she has to open the remaining boxes one by one. Once a box is opened, the 
prize sealed inside is publicly revealed and deleted from the list of possible prizes.  
The more boxes are opened, the more information the contestant receives about 
the distribution of possible prizes inside her box. After opening several boxes the 
contestant receives an offer from the “bank” (the timing of “bank” offers is presented on 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 in the Appendix). The “bank” offers either a sure monetary amount 
in exchange for the contestant’s box or the possibility to swap the contestant’s box for 
any of the remaining unopened boxes. If the contestant rejects the sure amount, and 
regardless of the contestant’s decision on the swap offer, she has to continue opening 
boxes one by one until the “bank” makes another offer or all boxes are opened. 
Monetary offers are fairly predictable across episodes and follow a general pattern. 
When many boxes remain unopened, the “bank” offers amounts significantly below the 
expected value of possible prizes. As more and more boxes are opened, the gap between the 
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expected value of remaining prizes and a monetary offer decreases. The game terminates 
either when the contestant accepts a sure monetary amount or when all boxes are opened. 
In the latter case, the contestant leaves with the content of her box, which is opened last. 
Our dataset consists of 114 episodes of the Italian version of the show (Affari 
Tuoi) broadcasted on the first channel of Italian television RAI Uno from September 20, 
2005 to March 4, 2006 and 275 episodes of the British version of the show (Deal or No 
Deal UK) aired on Channel 4 of the British television from October 31, 2005 to October 
13, 20065. In every episode, only one contestant plays the game and she decides on at 
least one monetary offer.6 The variables that we use in the empirical estimation are the 
contestant’s decision to accept or to reject an offer and the distribution of possible prizes 
that the contestant can potentially win at the moment when she makes each decision. 
45.6% of Italian contestants and 50.2% of British contestants are male. Average 
age is 46.3 years for the Italian contestants and 41 years for the British contestants. 14.0% 
and 78.9% of Italian contestants and 48.3% and 50.8% of British contestants are 
correspondingly single and married. Representatives of all administrative regions of Italy 
and representatives of 22 administrative regions of the United Kingdom appear in our 
recorded dataset. Thus, this natural experiment employs a more representative subject 
pool than conventional pools, composed primarily of undergraduate students. 
Ex ante expected value of monetary prizes that are allocated across boxes is 
€52,295 in Affari Tuoi and £25,712 in Deal or No Deal UK. Average and median 
                                                 
5 Blavatskyy and Pogrebna (2007) and Pogrebna (2007) describe in detail television shows Affari Tuoi and 
Deal or No Deal UK. Blavatskyy and Pogrebna (2007) also provide a detailed review of numerous working 
papers that analyze data from different national versions of the television show Deal or No Deal. 
6 In our recorded sample only one Affari Tuoi contestant accepted the first monetary offer from the “bank” 
(€18,000). Ten contestants accepted the second monetary offer that they received from the “bank”. 34 
contestants accepted their third monetary offer. All remaining contestants received from 4 to 7 monetary 
offers.  In Deal or No Deal UK all contestants rejected the first two monetary offers, 9 contestants accepted 
the third monetary offer and all remaining contestants received from 4 to 7 monetary offers. 
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earnings of Italian contestants are €29,516 and €19,000 respectively. Average and median 
earnings of British contestants are £16,069 and £13,000 correspondingly. Overall, 
obtaining a similar dataset in conventional laboratory conditions would be a highly 
ambitious project, since it would require a total budget of almost 10 million euros.  
The natural experiment allows us to use a more representative subject pool and 
significantly higher incentives than in a typical laboratory experiment. However, it has a 
disadvantage that we do not have any control over sure amounts that are offered to the 
contestants. Moreover, a precise mechanism of setting “bank” offers is not revealed to the 
public in official show regulations. Table 1 and Table 2 show that the variability in 
“bank” monetary offers is largely explained by only one variable—the expected value of 
possible prizes (particularly when few boxes remain unopened). We also regressed 
“bank” monetary offers on other lottery-specific variables (a median possible prize, the 
standard deviation of possible prizes and a prize hidden inside the contestant’s box) and 
socio-demographic characteristics of contestants (gender, age, marital status and region). 
Among these variables, only regression coefficient on the standard deviation of possible 
prizes was statistically significant (the more dispersed are the prizes, the lower is the 
offer). Notably, regression coefficient on the prize inside the contestant’s box was never 
statistically significant, i.e. there is no information content in “bank” offers in our sample. 
Number of 
unopened boxes 2 3 4 5 8 11 
Constant 0βˆ  -0.9796 -3.0064 0.6209 0.6610 -0.5971 -5.2172 
Expected value 1βˆ 1.0572 1.1960 0.8479 0.8395 0.9308 1.3314 
R2 0.9285 0.8725 0.9829 0.8870 0.7216 0.6555 
Observations 41 11 13 96 111 114 
Table 1 Ordinary least squares regression εEVO ++= lnln 10 ββ  of “bank” 
monetary offers O  on expected value EV  of possible prizes in Affari Tuoi 
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Number of 
unopened boxes 2 5 8 11 14 17 
Constant 0βˆ  -0.3603 -0.8851 -1.1097 -2.7589 -6.7005 -13.9471
Expected value 1βˆ 0.9995 1.0206 1.0201 1.1627 1.5142 2.1725 
R2 0.9909 0.8992 0.7429 0.5729 0.3853 0.3300 
Observations 114 202 264 275 275 269 
Table 2 Ordinary least squares regression εEVO ++= lnln 10 ββ  of “bank” 
monetary offers O  on expected value EV  of possible prizes in Deal or No Deal UK 
4. Results  
In Deal or No Deal television show contestants face a series of binary choices 
between a degenerate lottery (“bank” monetary offer for certain) and a risky lottery. We 
will consider first a static case when contestants evaluate a risky lottery as a lottery that 
delivers each of the possible prizes (that have not yet been eliminated from the game) 
with equal probability. Then we will consider a dynamic case, when contestants evaluate 
a risky lottery taking into account the expectation of future “bank” offers that they will 
receive if they reject the current offer.  
Since every contestant makes only up to 7 decisions, we adopt a representative 
agent approach and estimate every pair of decision theory and stochastic choice model on 
the aggregate data. The utility of lotteries is evaluated through the parametric form of 
decision theories described in section 2. The free parameters of decision theories are 
estimated by maximizing the log-likelihood function of a selected model of stochastic 
choice described in section 1. Non-linear unconstrained optimization was implemented in 
the Matlab 7.2 package (based on the Nelder-Mead simplex algorithm).  
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4.1. Static decision problem 
In a static decision problem, a contestant facing prizes nxx ,...,1  hidden in n  
unopened boxes perceives them as a risky lottery ( )nxnxL n 1,;...;1,1 . In other words, the 
contestant behaves as if after rejecting a current “bank” offer she receives each of the 
remaining prizes with equal probability. Table 3 shows maximum likelihood estimates of 
the parameters of decision theories embedded in five different models of stochastic 
choice and a corresponding log-likelihood of observing actual decisions of Affari Tuoi 
contestants. A comparison of parameter estimates of the same decision theory across 
different columns of Table 3 demonstrates our first somewhat unexpected result:  
For example, estimates of EUT with CRRA utility function indicate risk neutrality in a 
tremble model, risk aversion—in a Fechner model, and risk seeking (on average)—in a 
random utility model. Estimates of DAT indicate disappointment neutrality in a tremble 
model, strong disappointment seeking—in a Fechner model with homoscedastic and 
heteroscedastic errors and slight disappointment aversion—in the remaining models. 
Estimates of EUT with EP utility function show that 0<r  and 0>α  for all 
models except for a tremble model i.e. contestants exhibit increasing relative risk aversion 
and increasing absolute risk aversion. Estimates of RT (SSB) are consistent with the 
assumption of regret aversion only in a Fechner model with heteroscedastic errors and in 
a random utility model. Estimates of YDM show no probability distortions in a tremble 
model, overweighting of small probabilities—in a Fechner model with homoscedastic 
and heteroscedastic errors, and underweighting of small probabilities—in the remaining 
Result 1 Estimated parameters of the same decision theory differ substantially, 
depending on which model of stochastic choice the theory is embedded in.  
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models of stochastic choice. Under RDEU, the utility function is estimated to be linear in 
a tremble model, concave—in a Fechner model, and convex (on average)—in a random 
utility model. 
Fechner model of random errors  Model of 
stochastic  
choice  
Decision theory 
Tremble Homo-
scedastic 
Hetero-
scedastic  
Hetero-
scedastic & 
truncated  
Random 
utility 
RN 
=p 0.1603 
=LL -179.2 
=σ 68685 
=LL -225.8 
=σ 0.1698 
=LL -196.8 
=σ 0.3267 
=LL -174.2 −∞=LL  
EUT + CRRA 
=p 0.1603 
=r 0 
=LL -179.2 
=σ 328.4 
=r 0.4004 
=LL -206.0 
=σ 0.1413 
=r 0.1928 
=LL -193.1 
=σ 4.0367 
=r 0.2894 
=LL -165.8 
=μ -0.2664 
=σ 0.8619 
=LL -174.3 
EUT + EP 
=p 0.1065 
=r -0.3389 
=α -0.0013 
=LL -168.9 
=σ 10293 
=r -0.0199 
=α 8.2*10-6 
=LL -176.9 
=σ 0.1229 
=r -0.0639 
=α 4.9*10-6 
=LL -175.1 
=σ 2.7150 
=r -0.1442 
=α 2.2*10-6 
=LL -157.3 
=μ -0.6227 
=σ 1.1254 
=α 2.6*10-9 
=LL -172.6 
RT (SSB) 
=p 0.1603 
=r 0 
=δ 1 
=LL -179.2 
=σ 103.573
=r 0.2147 
=δ 0.6707 
=LL -204.09
=σ 0.1401 
=r 0.2107 
=δ 1.0549 
=LL -193.1 
=σ 3.8392 
=r -0.3929 
=δ 0.3876 
=LL -163.6 
=μ 0.0130 
=σ 0.7210 
=δ 19.0623 
=LL -172.4 
YDM 
=p 0.1603 
=γ 1 
=LL -179.2 
=σ 40628 
=γ 0.3151 
=LL -202.6 
=σ 0.1804 
=γ 0.5302 
=LL -177.9 
=σ 0.3295 
=γ 1.9753 
=LL -168.1 
=μ 2.3419 
=σ 2.0457 
=LL -178.1 
RDEU 
=p 0.1603 
=r 0 
=γ 1 
=LL -179.2 
=σ 273.7 
=r 0.4262 
=γ 0.5986 
=LL -193.3 
=σ 0.1747 
=r 0.0727 
=γ 0.5572 
=LL -177.8 
=σ 0.9782 
=r 0.2589 
=γ 1.5697 
=LL -165.8 
=μ -0.2498 
=σ 0.8576 
=γ 0.8264 
=LL -173.5 
DAT 
=p 0.1603 
=r 0 
=β 0 
=LL -179.2 
=σ 2.4008 
=r 1.0088 
=β -0.9999 
=LL -167.1 
=σ 0.6139 
=r 0.6280 
=β -0.9999 
=LL -169.6 
=σ 3.6060 
=r 0.2890 
=β 0.0960 
=LL -165.8 
=μ -0.2750 
=σ 0.8612 
=β 0.0226 
=LL -173.9 
Table 3 Maximum likelihood estimates of parameters of decision theories embedded 
in different models of stochastic choice and obtained log-likelihood values (data 
from Affari Tuoi, static decision problem) 
The estimated coefficient of the probability weighting function in RDEU 
embedded in a Fechner model with heteroscedastic truncated errors is significantly higher 
than one, which indicates that the probability weighting function is S-shaped and convex 
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nearly on its entire domain. This unexpected result incurs in all subsequent estimations 
and it is worthwhile to explain its cause. In a Fechner model with heteroscedastic 
truncated errors, random errors are likely to increase utility of lotteries that deliver 
improbable gains and the same random errors are likely to decrease utility of lotteries that 
deliver probable gains (e.g. Blavatskyy, 2007). Traditional inverse S-shaped probability 
weighting function of RDEU fulfils exactly the same role.  
RDEU embedded in a Fechner model with heteroscedastic truncated errors has 
two built-in components that both can lead to systematic overweighting of small 
probabilities and underweighting of large probabilities. In a maximum likelihood 
estimation of such model, there is no need to keep both components at work. If the 
estimated standard deviation of random errors converges to zero, the systematic effect of 
random errors disappears. If the estimated coefficient of the probability weighting 
function gets larger than one, traditional effect of probability distortions disappears. 
Clearly, Table 3 shows that the second possibility yields better fit to the data.  
To compare the fit of various combinations of a decision theory with a model of 
stochastic choice, we use a likelihood ratio test for nested models and Vuong likelihood 
ratio test for non-nested models (e.g. Vuong, 1989). Loomes et al. (2002, p.128) describe 
application of Vuong non-nested likelihood ratio test to the selection between different 
stochastic choice models. To compare the goodness of fit of non-nested models, we also 
use Clarke test (Clarke, 2003), which is a paired sign test on the log-likelihoods of every 
data point. The results of Vuong and Clarke tests turn out to be qualitatively similar. 
However, Clarke test is more discriminatory—for several non-nested models Vuong test 
shows no significant difference in their goodness of fit, while Clarke test indicates that 
one of the models is closer to the true data generating process. In the remainder of this 
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paper we report conclusions based on Vuong test and we mention instances when Clarke 
test yields stronger results.6 Our second important result can be summarized as follows.  
Perhaps not surprisingly, for every model of stochastic choice but a tremble model, the 
worst fit to the data is obtained when this model is combined with RN. However, there is 
no single decision theory that provides the best goodness of fit in all models. 
Result 3 implies that any comparison of decision theories should be always 
reported with a reference to the model of stochastic choice that is being used. Otherwise, 
a hunter for a descriptive decision theory would claim that DAT performs better than 
other theories in a Fechner model with homoscedastic and heteroscedastic errors. A 
researcher who employs a Fechner model with heteroscedastic truncated errors or a 
tremble model would claim that EUT with EP utility function performs better than other 
theories. At the same time a researcher who uses a random utility model would conclude 
that EUT, RDEU and DAT perform better than other theories.  
Table 4 shows the estimated parameters of decision theories embedded into 
different models of stochastic choice and a corresponding log-likelihood of the decisions 
of Deal or No Deal UK contestants. Result 1 is clearly confirmed in Table 4. For 
                                                 
6 The results of Clarke test are not reported in this paper but they are available from the authors on request. 
Result 2 For every decision theory, the best fit to the data is obtained when this 
theory is embedded into a Fechner model with heteroscedastic truncated errors.  
Result 3 Which decision theory provides the best goodness of fit depends on the 
selected model of stochastic choice. For example, it is EUT with EP utility 
function in a tremble model, DAT—in a Fechner model of homoscedastic errors, 
and either EUT with EP utility function or RDEU—in a Fechner model of 
heteroscedastic truncated errors.
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example, when YDM is incorporated into a Fechner model with homoscedastic or 
heteroscedastic errors, estimated probability weighting function has an inverse S-shape 
( 1<γ ), but it has S-shape ( 1>γ ) when YDM is incorporated in other models. 
Fechner model of random errors  Model of 
stochastic  
choice  
Decision theory 
Tremble Homo-
scedastic 
Hetero-
scedastic  
Hetero-
scedastic & 
truncated  
Random 
utility 
RN 
=p 0.1476 
=LL -586.8 
=σ 17767 
=LL -638.5 
=σ 0.1144 
=LL -610.6 
=σ 0.3264 
=LL -462.7 −∞=LL  
EUT + CRRA 
=p 0.1365 
=r 0.2506 
=LL -557.7 
=σ 336.97 
=r 0.3098 
=LL -545.8 
=σ 0.0719 
=r 0.2710 
=LL -537.7 
=σ 0.5043 
=r 0.1294 
=LL -458.5 
=μ 0.1774 
=σ 0.2981 
=LL -478.5 
EUT + EP 
=p 0.0844 
=r -0.3849 
=α -0.00156
=LL -510.1 
=σ 4127.7 
=r 0.0229 
=α 1.2*10-5 
=LL -505.9 
=σ 0.0762 
=r 0.1489 
=α 2.9*10-5 
=LL -522.9 
=σ 1.1347 
=r -0.1737 
=α 2.6*10-6 
=LL -441.1 
=μ -0.0972 
=σ 0.5520 
=α 3.6*10-9 
=LL -517.7 
RT (SSB) 
=p 0.1337 
=r 0.2974 
=δ 1.2107 
=LL -550.2 
=σ 729.89 
=r 0.3877 
=δ 1.2135 
=LL -542.6 
=σ 0.0668 
=r 0.3546 
=δ 1.3264 
=LL -527.9 
=σ 0.2992 
=r 0.2726 
=δ 1.7111 
=LL -455.9 
=μ 0.3229 
=σ 0.2462 
=δ 1.6046 
=LL -467.6 
YDM 
=p 0.1422 
=γ 1.3582 
=LL -572.2 
=σ 13425 
=γ 0.3151 
=LL -543.0 
=σ 0.1165 
=γ 0.4512 
=LL -484.7 
=σ 0.3994 
=γ 2.5381 
=LL -447.4 
=μ 1.8238 
=σ 1.2214 
=LL -513.7 
RDEU 
=p 0.1287 
=r 0.3159 
=γ 0.6706 
=LL -537.0 
=σ 169.57 
=r 0.3875 
=γ 0.6150 
=LL -486.0 
=σ 0.0883 
=r 0.2887 
=γ 0.6286 
=LL -460.4 
=σ 0.1922 
=r -0.3037 
=γ 2.4558 
=LL -440.0 
=μ 0.2466 
=σ 0.2672 
=γ 0.7849 
=LL -462.6 
DAT 
=p 0.1351 
=r 0.0012 
=β 0.5497 
=LL -553.9 
=σ 1.2772 
=r 0.9656 
=β -0.9265 
=LL -473.8 
=σ 0.4462 
=r 0.7378 
=β -0.9999 
=LL -506.0 
=σ 0.2187 
=r -0.1776 
=β 1.6644 
=LL -445.7 
=μ 0.1403 
=σ 0.3073 
=β 0.1113 
=LL -472.6 
Table 4 Maximum likelihood estimates of parameters of decision theories embedded 
in different models of stochastic choice and obtained log-likelihood values (data 
from Deal or No Deal UK, static decision problem) 
Maximum likelihood estimate of EUT with CRRA utility function shows that 
Deal or No Deal UK contestants are slightly risk averse (with a coefficient of relative risk 
aversion being between 0.13 and 0.31). Maximum likelihood estimate of EUT with EP 
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utility function shows that contestants exhibit increasing relative risk aversion ( 0>α ) in 
all models except for a tremble model. They also reveal decreasing absolute risk aversion 
( 0>r ) in a Fechner model with homoscedastic or heteroscedastic errors. However, 
contestants exhibit increasing absolute risk aversion ( 0<r ) in the remaining models. 
Maximum likelihood estimate of RDEU shows that Deal or No Deal UK 
contestants have an inverse S-shaped probability weighting function (with coefficient γ  
being between 0.61 and 0.79) and a concave utility function (with a coefficient of relative 
risk aversion being between 0.24 and 0.39) in all models except for a Fechner model with 
heteroscedastic truncated errors. Estimate of DAT shows that contestants are 
disappointment seeking in a Fechner model with homoscedastic or heteroscedastic errors 
and disappointment averse—in the remaining models. 
Similar as in the Italian dataset, Result 2 holds: every decision theory describes 
the decisions of Deal or No Deal UK contestants most accurately, when it is embedded in 
a Fechner model with heteroscedastic truncated errors. For every model of stochastic 
choice, the worst fit to the data is obtained when this model is combined with RN. Table 
5 compares the goodness of fit of selected pairs of a decision theory and a stochastic 
choice model (for each model we selected two theories that outperformed other theories 
embedded in the same stochastic choice model). Result 3 clearly holds in Table 5. In a 
tremble model and a Fechner model with heteroscedastic truncated errors, EUT with EP 
utility function and RDEU are most successful in describing the decisions of contestants. 
In a Fechner model with homoscedastic errors, the decisions of Deal or No Deal UK 
contestants are best predicted by DAT or RDEU. In a Fechner model with heteroscedastic 
errors and a random utility model, RDEU gives the best fit to the data.  
By comparing the goodness of fit across different models of stochastic choice, it 
is apparent that decision theories embedded in a tremble model perform significantly 
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worse compared to theories embedded in other models. Decision theories embedded in a 
Fechner model with homoscedastic errors yield similar goodness of fit as the theories 
embedded in a random utility model (Carbone (1997) and Loomes et al. (2002) find 
similar evidence in laboratory experiments). RDEU embedded into a Fechner model with 
heteroscedastic errors and RDEU or EUT with EP utility function embedded into a 
Fechner model with heteroscedastic truncated errors provide the best fit to the data. 
Stochastic 
Choice 
Model 
→ Tremble Model 
Fechner model, 
homoscedastic 
errors 
Fechner model, 
heteroscedastic 
errors 
Fechner model, 
heteroscedastic 
truncated errors
Random  
Utility Model 
↓ Decision Theory 
EUT+
EP RDEU DAT RDEU RDEU YDM RDEU 
EUT+
EP RDEU 
RT 
(SSB) 
EUT+
EP - 
1.1770 
(0.1196) 
-2.2668 
(0.0117)
-1.0319 
(0.1511)
-2.3669 
(0.0090)
-1.3135 
(0.0945)
-4.0456 
(0.0000)
-5.8390 
(0.0000) 
-2.3357 
(0.0098) 
-2.1240 
(0.0168)
T
re
m
bl
e 
M
od
el
 
RDEU -1.1770 (0.1196) - 
-4.0060 
(0.0000)
-2.9605 
(0.0015)
-6.5558 
(0.0000)
-4.1938 
(0.0000)
-7.3285 
(0.0000)
-5.8528 
(0.0000) 
-5.2530 
(0.0000) 
-4.9651 
(0.0000)
DAT 2.2668 (0.0117) 
4.0060 
(0.0000) - 
0.8043 
(0.2106)
-1.0934 
(0.1371)
0.8275 
(0.2040)
-3.4814 
(0.0002)
-3.5001 
(0.0002) 
-0.9827 
(0.1629) 
-0.5782 
(0.2816)
Fe
ch
ne
r 
m
od
el
, 
ho
m
o-
sc
ed
as
tic
  
RDEU 1.0319 (0.1511) 
2.9605 
(0.0015) 
-0.8043 
(0.2106)
- -2.1569 (0.0155)
-0.1589 
(0.4369)
-3.9607 
(0.0000)
-2.7439 
(0.0030) 
-1.4736 
(0.0703) 
-1.1885 
(0.1173)
RDEU 2.3669 (0.0090) 
6.5558 
(0.0000) 
1.0934 
(0.1371)
2.1569 
(0.0155) - 
3.3470 
(0.0004)
-2.3506 
(0.0094)
-1.4655 
(0.0714) 
0.2120 
(0.4160) 
0.7536 
(0.2256)
Fe
ch
ne
r 
m
od
el
, 
he
te
ro
-
sc
ed
as
tic
 
YDM 1.3135 (0.0945) 
4.1938 
(0.0000) 
-0.8275 
(0.2040)
0.1589 
(0.4369)
-3.3470 
(0.0004) - 
-6.8205 
(0.0000)
-3.8375 
(0.0001) 
-1.7646 
(0.0388) 
-1.3467 
(0.0890)
RDEU 4.0456 (0.0000) 
7.3285 
(0.0000) 
3.4814 
(0.0002)
3.9607 
(0.0000)
2.3506 
(0.0094)
6.8205 
(0.0000) - 
0.1441 
(0.4427) 
1.9521 
(0.0255) 
2.4064 
(0.0081)
Fe
ch
ne
r,
 
he
te
ro
-
sc
ed
as
tic
 
tr
un
ca
te
d 
EUT+
EP 
5.8390 
(0.0000) 
5.8528 
(0.0000) 
3.5001 
(0.0002)
2.7439 
(0.0030)
1.4655 
(0.0714)
3.8375 
(0.0001)
-0.1441 
(0.4427) - 
1.5298 
(0.0630) 
1.9747 
(0.0242)
RDEU 2.3357 (0.0098) 
5.2530 
(0.0000) 
0.9827 
(0.1629)
1.4736 
(0.0703)
-0.2120 
(0.4160)
1.7646 
(0.0388)
-1.9521 
(0.0255)
-1.5298 
(0.0630) - 
0.9505 
(0.1709)
R
an
do
m
  
U
til
ity
 
M
od
el
 
RT 
(SSB) 
2.1240 
(0.0168) 
4.9651 
(0.0000) 
0.5782 
(0.2816)
1.1885 
(0.1173)
-0.7536 
(0.2256)
1.3467 
(0.0890)
-2.4064 
(0.0081)
-1.9747 
(0.0242) 
-0.9505 
(0.1709) - 
Table 5 Vuong non-nested likelihood ratio test (p-value) of selected pairs of a 
decision theory and a stochastic choice model (Deal or No Deal UK, static problem). 
A significantly positive (negative) value indicates that a row (column) pair is closer 
to the true data generating process than a column (row) pair. Akaike Information 
Criterion is used to adjust for a smaller number of parameters in YDM.  
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4.2. Dynamic decision problem 
In a dynamic decision problem, contestants take into account future offers that the 
“bank” makes if the current offer is rejected. A contestant facing prizes 1x  and 2x  hidden 
in two unopened boxes perceives them as a risky lottery ( )21,;21, 21 xxL  just as in a 
static decision problem.7 A contestant facing prizes { }nxx ,...,1=x  hidden in 2>n  
unopened boxes perceives them as a risky lottery ( )xL . Let m  denote the number of 
boxes that the contestant has to open before the next “bank” offer is made ( m  is either 1 
or 3 in Affari Tuoi and 3=m  in Deal or No Deal UK). There are ( )( )!!! mnmnC n mn −=−  
combinations of prizes x  that the contestant can face when the next offer is made. Let us 
denote these combinations by n
mnC1
xx
−
,..., . Lottery ( )xL  is then recursively defined by  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )[ ]
( ),ˆ
,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,
ˆ1
1
1
∑
∑
−
−
=−
−
=−
−
+
+<+≥−=
n
mn
n
mn
C
i
in
mn
mn
C
i
iiiiiin
mn
mn
L
C
OuLuIOOuLuIL
C
L
x
θxθxxθxθxxx
π
π
 
where  ( )iO xˆ  is the expectation of a future “bank” offer for ix  prizes left in the unopened 
boxes and mn−πˆ  is the expected probability that the “bank” offers a swap option instead 
of a monetary amount at the stage when mn −  boxes remain unopened.8 Notice that we 
use a fully rational forward looking algorithm for calculating the reduced form of lottery 
                                                 
7 In the Italian and the British version of Deal or No Deal the “bank” does not make any further monetary 
offers when a monetary offer for two prizes is rejected. Therefore, in this case a dynamic decision problem 
coincides with a static decision problem because there are no anticipated “bank” offers in the future.  
8 For any two lotteries ( )kk pypyL ,;...;, 111  and ( )ll qzqzL ,;...;, 112  a compound lottery ( ) 21 1 LL αα −+ , [ ]1,0∈α , is defined in the usual way—it yields outcome iy  with probability ip⋅α , { }ki ,...,1∈ , and outcome jz  with probability ( ) jq⋅−α1 , { }lj ,...,1∈ . 
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( )xL . An alternative approach is to derive an approximation of lottery ( )xL  by means of 
Monte Carlo simulations. 
If a decision theory satisfies the independence axiom, e.g. EUT or RN, the utility 
of lottery ( )xL  can be conveniently calculated through a Bellman optimality equation 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ){ } ( )( )[ ]∑−
=
−−
−
+−=
n
mnC
i
imniimnn
mn
LuOuLu
C
Lu
1
,ˆ,ˆ,,maxˆ11, θxθxθxθx ππ . 
However, this equation does not hold for generalized non-expected utility theories.  
Since “bank” offers are highly correlated with the expected value of the remaining 
prizes, the expectation of future “bank” offers ( )iO xˆ  is calculated by means of a simple 
regression ( ) ( )ii EVO xx lnˆˆˆln 10 ββ += , where estimates of coefficients 0βˆ  and 1βˆ  are 
taken from Table 1 and Table 2 and ( )iEV x  is the expected value of prizes ix , 
{ }n mnCi −∈ ,...,1 . Probability mn−πˆ  is equal to the actual probability with which the “bank” 
made a swap offer in our recorded sample. In Deal or No Deal UK the “bank” made swap 
offers instead of a monetary offer only in the first offer in the game. Therefore, 
probability mn−πˆ  is set equal to zero for the British dataset. 
Estimation of a random utility model in a dynamic decision problem deserves 
special attention. In a random utility model, preferences of a decision maker change each 
time when a new decision is made. Thus, it is not immediately clear how such individual 
forms expectations about own future decisions. We assume the simplest possible scenario 
that contestants expect to keep on maximizing their current preferences (as captured by 
current parameters of decision theory) while making decisions in the future. 
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Table 6 shows maximum likelihood estimates for a dynamic decision problem in 
Affari Tuoi. In our sample the “bank” made only 2 offers (0.5%) higher than the expected 
value of the remaining prizes. Thus, the estimates for RN are identical for a static and a 
dynamic problem, because contestants anticipate that future offers will be less than 
actuarially fair, and hence they will be always rejected by a risk neutral decision maker. 
Fechner model of random errors  Model of 
stochastic  
choice  
Decision theory 
Tremble Homo-
scedastic 
Hetero-
scedastic  
Hetero-
scedastic & 
truncated  
Random 
utility 
RN 
=p 0.1603 
=LL -179.2 
=σ 68685 
=LL -225.8 
=σ 0.1697 
=LL -196.8 
=σ 0.3267 
=LL -174.2 −∞=LL  
EUT + CRRA 
=p 0.1603 
=r 0 
=LL -179.2 
=σ 176.74 
=r 0.4542 
=LL -205.5 
=σ 0.1413 
=r 0.1929 
=LL -193.1 
=σ 1.6139 
=r 0.2820 
=LL -165.8 
=μ -0.1201 
=σ 0.8935 
=LL -166.04
EUT + EP 
=p 0.1063 
=r -0.3389 
=α -0.0013 
=LL -168.9 
=σ 52612 
=r -0.2213 
=α 2.42*10-6
=LL -174.7 
=σ 0.1487 
=r -0.2052 
=α 2.37*10-6
=LL -171.8 
=σ 1.7651 
=r -0.1564 
=α 2.2*10-6 
=LL -157.4 
=μ -0.7846 
=σ 1.1035 
=α 1.0*10-6 
=LL -153.8 
RT (SSB) 
=p 0.1603 
=r 0 
=δ 1 
=LL -179.2 
=σ 24.828 
=r -0.0270 
=δ 0.4127 
=LL -197.7 
=σ 0.1401 
=r 0.2107 
=δ 1.0548 
=LL -193.1 
=σ 4.4475 
=r 0.0371 
=δ 0.6201 
=LL -164.2 
=μ -0.2926 
=σ 1.0905 
=δ 0.7420 
=LL -165.94
YDM 
=p 0.1603 
=γ 1 
=LL -179.2 
=σ 38430 
=γ 0.3113 
=LL -203.1 
=σ 0.1743 
=γ 0.5347 
=LL -177.2 
=σ 0.3174 
=γ 1.8288 
=LL -168.3 
=μ 1.3618 
=σ 1.0818 
=LL -173.4 
RDEU 
=p 0.1603 
=r 0 
=γ 1 
=LL -179.2 
=σ 273.15 
=r 0.4244 
=γ 0.6192 
=LL -194.0 
=σ 0.1640 
=r 0.0204 
=γ 0.5133 
=LL -176.9 
=σ 1.1057 
=r 0.2712 
=γ 1.1106 
=LL -165.8 
=μ -0.1336 
=σ 0.9089 
=γ 1.0201 
=LL -166.03
DAT 
=p 0.1603 
=r 0 
=β 0 
=LL -179.2 
=σ 3.3624 
=r 0.9619 
=β -0.9857 
=LL -171.9 
=σ 0.6134 
=r 0.6286 
=β -0.9999 
=LL -169.6 
=σ 9.6590 
=r 0.2902 
=β -0.0213 
=LL -165.8 
=μ -0.0903 
=σ 0.8754 
=β -0.0230 
=LL -165.99
Table 6 Maximum likelihood estimates of parameters of decision theories embedded 
in different models of stochastic choice and obtained log-likelihood values (data 
from Affari Tuoi, dynamic decision problem) 
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Table 6 also shows that the estimates of all decision theories embedded in a 
tremble model are identical for a static and a dynamic decision problem. Moreover, for 
all theories that have RN as a special case, the estimates are the same as for RN. This 
accidental result is driven by a mass point in “bank” offers. In our recorded sample of 
Affari Tuoi 9 offers (2.2%) are exactly equal to the expected value of the remaining prizes 
(4 of these offers were accepted). RN embedded in a tremble model predicts that the log-
likelihood of observing contestants’ decisions on these offers is ( )21log9 ⋅ . Any other 
decision theory that does not assume perfect risk neutrality predicts that the log-
likelihood of observing contestants’ decisions on these offers is ( ) ( )pp −+ 1log5log4  or 
( ) ( )pp −+ 1log4log5  where p is a probability of a tremble. When p is small, each of 
these log-likelihood values is significantly lower than ( )21log9 ⋅ , which handicaps non-
RN theories. For example, Figure 3 in Appendix shows that the log-likelihood functions 
of EUT and YDM have a sizeable spike corresponding to a special case of RN. 
A comparison of Table 3 and Table 6 shows that all decision theories embedded 
in a random utility model provide a better fit to the data in a dynamic rather than a static 
decision problem. Theories embedded in a Fechner model also tend to have a better fit in 
a dynamic decision problem (especially in a Fechner model with heteroscedastic errors). 
However, this result is never statistically significant and for some decision theories 
embedded in a Fechner model the fit is actually worse in the dynamic decision problem. 
Estimated parameters of decision theories are similar in a dynamic and a static 
decision problem and Result 1 holds. Interestingly, the standard deviation of stochastic 
parameters in a random utility model tends to be higher but the variance of random errors 
in a Fechner model tends to be lower in a dynamic decision problem. Thus, a higher 
dispersion of preferences but a lower dispersion of random errors is required for 
explaining individual decision making in a dynamic problem.  
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Result 2 holds for all theories except for EUT with EP utility function. However, 
for any decision theory except for RN there is no significant difference between its 
prediction in a Fechner model with heteroscedastic truncated errors and its prediction in a 
random utility model. This comes as a result of improvement in the prediction of a 
random utility model in a dynamic problem compared to a static problem (whereas the 
prediction of a Fechner model did not change significantly).  
Table 7 compares the fit of two most successful theories within every model. 
Result 3 clearly holds in Table 7. The best fit to the data is provided by EUT with EP 
utility function when it is embedded in either a Fechner model with heteroscedastic 
truncated errors or a random utility model. 
Stochastic 
Choice 
Model 
→ Tremble Model 
Fechner model, 
homoscedastic 
errors 
Fechner model, 
heteroscedastic 
errors 
Fechner model, 
heteroscedastic 
truncated errors
Random  
Utility Model 
↓ Decision Theory 
EUT+
EP RN DAT 
EUT+
EP DAT 
EUT+
EP 
EUT+
EP 
RT 
(SSB) 
EUT+
EP 
RT 
(SSB) 
EUT+
EP - 
0.9552 
(0.1698) 
0.3513 
(0.3627)
6.7160 
(0.0000)
0.0869 
(0.4654)
0.3159 
(0.3760)
-1.4208 
(0.0777)
-0.5242 
(0.3001) 
-0.6348 
(0.2628) 
-0.2862 
(0.3874)
T
re
m
bl
e 
M
od
el
 
RN -0.9552 
(0.1698) 
- -1.0948 
(0.1368)
5.1655 
(0.0000)
-1.9433 
(0.0260)
-0.5816 
(0.2804)
-2.4603 
(0.0069)
-2.4175 
(0.0078) 
-1.5190 
(0.0644) 
-2.0415 
(0.0206)
DAT -0.3513 
(0.3627) 
1.0948 
(0.1368) 
- 5.6689 
(0.0000)
-0.8866 
(0.1877)
-0.0176 
(0.4930)
-2.6116 
(0.0045)
-5.5139 
(0.0000) 
-1.0573 
(0.1452) 
-1.1736 
(0.1203)
Fe
ch
ne
r 
m
od
el
, 
ho
m
o-
sc
ed
as
tic
  
EUT+
EP 
-6.7160 
(0.0000) 
-5.1655 
(0.0000) 
-5.6689 
(0.0000)
- -5.7487 
(0.0000)
-7.9990 
(0.0000)
-7.1385 
(0.0000)
-6.2497 
(0.0000) 
-6.0319 
(0.0000) 
-5.9889 
(0.0000)
DAT -0.0869 
(0.4654) 
1.9433 
(0.0260) 
0.8866 
(0.1877)
5.7487 
(0.0000)
- 0.2528 
(0.4002)
-1.8456 
(0.0325)
-1.6047 
(0.0543) 
-0.7727 
(0.2199) 
-0.7919 
(0.2142)
Fe
ch
ne
r 
m
od
el
, 
he
te
ro
-
sc
ed
as
tic
 
EUT+
EP 
-0.3159 
(0.3760) 
0.5816 
(0.2804) 
0.0176 
(0.4930)
7.9990 
(0.0000)
-0.2528 
(0.4002)
- -1.9501 
(0.0256)
-0.9556 
(0.1696) 
-0.8438 
(0.1994) 
-0.7006 
(0.2418)
EUT+
EP 
1.4208 
(0.0777) 
2.4603 
(0.0069) 
2.6116 
(0.0045)
7.1385 
(0.0000)
1.8456 
(0.0325)
1.9501 
(0.0256)
- 1.3797 
(0.0838) 
-0.5785 
(0.2815) 
1.0409 
(0.1490)
Fe
ch
ne
r,
 
he
te
ro
-
sc
ed
as
tic
 
tr
un
ca
te
d 
RT 
(SSB) 
0.5242 
(0.3001) 
2.4175 
(0.0078) 
5.5139 
(0.0000)
6.2497 
(0.0000)
1.6047 
(0.0543)
0.9556 
(0.1696)
-1.3797 
(0.0838)
- -0.1764 
(0.4300) 
0.3388 
(0.3674)
EUT+
EP 
0.6348 
(0.2628) 
1.5190 
(0.0644) 
1.0573 
(0.1452)
6.0319 
(0.0000)
0.7727 
(0.2199)
0.8438 
(0.1994)
0.5785 
(0.2815)
0.1764 
(0.4300) 
- 0.3396 (0.3671)
R
an
do
m
  
U
til
ity
 
M
od
el
 
RT 
(SSB) 
0.2862 
(0.3874) 
2.0415 
(0.0206) 
1.1736 
(0.1203)
5.9889 
(0.0000)
0.7919 
(0.2142)
0.7006 
(0.2418)
-1.0409 
(0.1490)
-0.3388 
(0.3674) 
-0.3396 
(0.3671) - 
Table 7 Vuong non-nested likelihood ratio test (p-value) of selected pairs of a 
decision theory and a stochastic choice model (Affari Tuoi, dynamic problem). A 
significantly positive (negative) value indicates that a row (column) pair is closer to 
the true data generating process than a column (row) pair. Akaike Information 
Criterion is used to adjust for a smaller number of parameters in RN. 
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Fechner model of random errors  Model of 
stochastic  
choice  
Decision theory 
Tremble Homo-
scedastic 
Hetero-
scedastic  
Hetero-
scedastic & 
truncated  
Random 
utility 
RN 
=p 0.1476 
=LL -586.8 
=σ 17767 
=LL -638.5 
=σ 0.1144 
=LL -610.6 
=σ 0.3264 
=LL -462.7 −∞=LL  
EUT + CRRA 
=p 0.1365 
=r 0.2530 
=LL -557.7 
=σ 325.03 
=r 0.3128 
=LL -545.7 
=σ 0.0719 
=r 0.2709 
=LL -537.7 
=σ 0.5043 
=r 0.1294 
=LL -458.5 
=μ 0.0945 
=σ 0.6433 
=LL -453.1 
EUT + EP 
=p 0.0844 
=r -0.3842 
=α -0.00157
=LL -510.1 
=σ 972091 
=r -0.5903 
=α 1.5*10-7 
=LL -483.4 
=σ 0.1847 
=r -0.7031 
=α 5.9*10-8 
=LL -490.0 
=σ 2.9243 
=r -0.1630 
=α 3.0*10-6 
=LL -441.2 
=μ -1.8088 
=σ 2.2528 
=α 1.2*10-7 
=LL -548.0 
RT (SSB) 
=p 0.1299 
=r 0.3955 
=δ 1.7181 
=LL -544.6 
=σ 754.55 
=r 0.3829 
=δ 1.2239 
=LL -543.0 
=σ 0.0677 
=r 0.3446 
=δ 1.2903 
=LL -528.0 
=σ 0.2992 
=r 0.2726 
=δ 1.7111 
=LL -455.9 
=μ 0.3075 
=σ 0.3865 
=δ 1.8155 
=LL -440.8 
YDM 
=p 0.1422 
=γ 1.3583 
=LL -572.2 
=σ 13133 
=γ 0.4031 
=LL -544.1 
=σ 0.0942 
=γ 0.4787 
=LL -469.4 
=σ 0.2897 
=γ 1.5018 
=LL -445.4 
=μ 0.8003 
=σ 0.4019 
=LL -498.3 
RDEU 
=p 0.1287 
=r 0.3218 
=γ 0.6758 
=LL -537.0 
=σ 275.67 
=r 0.3304 
=γ 0.6076 
=LL -488.1 
=σ 0.0834 
=r 0.1842 
=γ 0.5868 
=LL -457.1 
=σ 0.2097 
=r -0.2617 
=γ 2.5316 
=LL -439.9 
=μ 0.1957 
=σ 0.4479 
=γ 0.7747 
=LL -444.6 
DAT 
=p 0.1344 
=r 0.0012 
=β 0.5214 
=LL -552.1 
=σ 0.3968 
=r 1.1045 
=β -0.9726 
=LL -467.9 
=σ 0.4470 
=r 0.7370 
=β -0.9999 
=LL -506.0 
=σ 0.1965 
=r -0.2442 
=β 1.7651 
=LL -442.4 
=μ 0.0321 
=σ 0.6430 
=β 0.1083 
=LL -451.9 
Table 8 Maximum likelihood estimates of parameters of decision theories embedded 
in different models of stochastic choice and obtained log-likelihood values (data 
from Deal or No Deal UK, dynamic decision problem) 
Table 8 shows maximum likelihood estimates for a dynamic decision problem in 
Deal or No Deal UK. In the British version of the show, only 4 monetary offers (0.3%) 
are more than actuarially fair. Thus, contestants do not expect that the “bank” offers a 
sure amount higher than the expected value of possible prizes. Hence, risk neutral 
individuals anticipate that they always reject “bank” offers in the future and the estimates 
of RN are identical in static and dynamic decision problems. The estimates of all decision 
theories embedded in a tremble model and their goodness of fit are nearly identical in 
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static and dynamic problems even though there is no mass point in “bank” offers in Deal 
or No Deal UK (only 4 offers, or 0.3%, are exactly equal to the expected value of 
possible prizes). Theories embedded in a Fechner model provide either better or the same 
goodness of fit in a dynamic problem as in a static problem (except for EUT with EP 
utility function and RDEU in a Fechner model of homoscedastic errors). All theories, 
except for EUT with EP utility function, embedded in a random utility model provide 
significantly better fit to the data in a dynamic decision problem. 
Result 1 holds in Table 8 (for instance, the estimated coefficients of YDM, RDEU 
and DAT vary significantly across different models of stochastic choice). Estimated 
parameters of decision theories and models of stochastic choice are generally similar in 
dynamic and static decision problems. However, there are few noticeable differences. 
Maximum likelihood estimate of EUT with EP utility function shows that contestants 
exhibit increasing absolute risk aversion ( 0<r ) in all models. The standard deviation of 
a stochastic parameter of all decision theories except for YDM embedded in a random 
utility model is higher in a dynamic problem.  
Result 2 holds for all decision theories except for EUT with CRRA utility 
function and RT (SSB). Table 9 compares the fit of two most successful theories within 
every model of stochastic choice. Result 3 continues to hold: EUT with EP utility 
function is the best descriptive decision theory in a tremble model, DAT—in a Fechner 
model of homoscedastic errors, RDEU—in the remaining two Fechner models, and RT 
(SSB) or RDEU—in a random utility model.  The best fit to the data across all models of 
stochastic choice is provided by RDEU or EUT with EP utility function embedded in a 
Fechner model with heteroscedastic truncated errors or by RT (SSB) embedded in a 
random utility model. However, Clarke test indicates that the decisions of contestants are 
most accurately described by RT (SSB) or RDEU embedded in a random utility model. 
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Stochastic 
Choice 
Model 
→ Tremble Model 
Fechner model, 
homoscedastic 
errors 
Fechner model, 
heteroscedastic 
errors 
Fechner model, 
heteroscedastic 
truncated errors
Random  
Utility Model 
↓ Decision Theory 
EUT+
EP RDEU DAT 
EUT+
EP RDEU YDM RDEU 
EUT+
EP 
RT 
(SSB) RDEU 
EUT+
EP - 
1.1753 
(0.1199) 
-2.9218 
(0.0017)
-1.5451 
(0.0612)
-2.5116 
(0.0060)
-1.9985 
(0.0228)
-3.9906 
(0.0000)
-5.8016 
(0.0000) 
-3.3941 
(0.0003) 
-3.2344 
(0.0006)
T
re
m
bl
e 
M
od
el
 
RDEU -1.1753 (0.1199) - 
-4.1799 
(0.0000)
-2.6762 
(0.0037)
-6.5246 
(0.0000)
-5.3821 
(0.0000)
-7.2772 
(0.0000)
-5.8346 
(0.0000) 
-5.7865 
(0.0000) 
-5.4530 
(0.0000)
DAT 2.9218 (0.0017) 
4.1799 
(0.0000) - 
0.8918 
(0.1862)
-0.8464 
(0.1987)
0.0439 
(0.4825)
-2.6414 
(0.0041)
-3.1809 
(0.0007) 
-2.1207 
(0.0170) 
-1.8113 
(0.0351)
Fe
ch
ne
r 
m
od
el
, 
ho
m
o-
sc
ed
as
tic
  
RDEU 1.5451 (0.0612) 
2.6762 
(0.0037) 
-0.8918 
(0.1862)
- -1.4919 (0.0679)
-0.8174 
(0.2069)
-2.7552 
(0.0029)
-2.8918 
(0.0019) 
-2.4208 
(0.0077) 
-2.2243 
(0.0131)
RDEU 2.5116 (0.0060) 
6.5246 
(0.0000) 
0.8464 
(0.1987)
1.4919 
(0.0679) - 
2.1691 
(0.0150)
-1.6544 
(0.0490)
-1.1500 
(0.1251) 
-1.4886 
(0.0683) 
-1.0952 
(0.1367)
Fe
ch
ne
r 
m
od
el
, 
he
te
ro
-
sc
ed
as
tic
 
YDM 1.9985 (0.0228) 
5.3821 
(0.0000) 
-0.0439 
(0.4825)
0.8174 
(0.2069)
-2.1691 
(0.0150) - 
-3.2280 
(0.0006)
-2.1156 
(0.0172) 
-2.3019 
(0.0107) 
-1.9562 
(0.0252)
RDEU 3.9906 (0.0000) 
7.2772 
(0.0000) 
2.6414 
(0.0041)
2.7552 
(0.0029)
1.6544 
(0.0490)
3.2280 
(0.0006) - 
0.1559 
(0.4380) 
0.0673 
(0.4732) 
0.3570 
(0.3605)
Fe
ch
ne
r,
 
he
te
ro
-
sc
ed
as
tic
 
tr
un
ca
te
d 
EUT+
EP 
5.8016 
(0.0000) 
5.8346 
(0.0000) 
3.1809 
(0.0007)
2.8918 
(0.0019)
1.1500 
(0.1251)
2.1156 
(0.0172)
-0.1559 
(0.4380) - 
-0.0286 
(0.4886) 
0.2345 
(0.4073)
RT 
(SSB) 
3.3941 
(0.0003) 
5.7865 
(0.0000) 
2.1207 
(0.0170)
2.4208 
(0.0077)
1.4886 
(0.0683)
2.3019 
(0.0107)
-0.0673 
(0.4732)
0.0286 
(0.4886) - 
1.1766 
(0.1197)
R
an
do
m
  
U
til
ity
 
M
od
el
 
RDEU 3.2344 (0.0006) 
5.4530 
(0.0000) 
1.8113 
(0.0351)
2.2243 
(0.0131)
1.0952 
(0.1367)
1.9562 
(0.0252)
-0.3570 
(0.3605)
-0.2345 
(0.4073) 
-1.1766 
(0.1197) - 
Table 9 Vuong non-nested likelihood ratio test (p-value) of selected pairs of a decision 
theory and a stochastic choice model (Deal or No Deal UK, dynamic problem). A 
significantly positive (negative) value indicates that a row (column) pair is closer to 
the true data generating process than a column (row) pair. Akaike Information 
Criterion is used to adjust for a smaller number of parameters in YDM.  
Both in static and dynamic decision problems, EUT with CRRA utility function 
always yields significantly worse fit to the data than EUT with EP utility function, except 
when EUT is embedded in a random utility model in Deal or No Deal UK dataset. Thus, 
constant relative risk aversion is ill-suited for decision problems that involve both small 
and large monetary outcomes. Constant absolute risk aversion generally cannot be 
rejected in a static decision problem (especially when EUT is embedded in a Fechner 
model). However, in a dynamic problem the estimated coefficient r  of EUT with EP 
utility function is always significantly different from zero. Thus, constant absolute risk 
aversion appears to be inappropriate functional form for dynamic decision problems. 
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Notice that when decision theories are embedded in a Fechner model of 
homoscedastic errors, the best fit to the data is provided by DAT. This confirms the 
finding of Camerer and Ho (1994) who reexamine the data from 11 laboratory studies 
and conclude that DAT provides “surprisingly good fit” when decision theories are 
estimated in a strong utility model, which is equivalent to our Fechner model of 
homoscedastic random errors.  
EUT with CRRA utility function embedded in a Fechner model of heteroscedastic 
truncated errors fits the data significantly better than RDEU embedded in a Fechner 
model of homoscedastic errors. This confirms the finding of Blavatskyy (2007) who 
reexamines the data from 10 laboratory studies and concludes that EUT embedded in a 
Fechner model with heteroscedastic truncated errors generally fit the data at least as good 
as rank-dependent theories embedded in a Fechner model with homoscedastic errors. 
5. Conclusion  
Decisions of heterogeneous individuals aggregated through the representative 
agent approach or repeated decisions of the same individual are often internally 
inconsistent and cannot be described by a deterministic decision theory on its own. Thus, 
such decisions are usually described by a deterministic theory embedded in a model of 
stochastic choice. Comparisons between different theories all embedded in the same 
model of stochastic choice are popular in an empirical research (e.g. Hey and Orme, 
1994). A less common approach is to compare the goodness of fit of different models all 
combined with the same decision theory. This paper embarks on an enterprise of 
organizing a round-robin tournament between different decision theories embedded in 
different models of stochastic choice. The results of this tournament are quite striking. 
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The estimated parameters of the same decision theory vary significantly when the 
theory is embedded into different models of stochastic choice. Thus, estimates of decision 
theories should be regarded as conditional on the selected model of stochastic choice. 
Moreover, various assumptions on individual risk attitudes (e.g. regret or disappointment 
aversion) may be satisfied in one model of stochastic choice and rejected in another. 
Therefore, when a researcher exogenously picks a model of stochastic choice, this has a 
profound effect on the estimated parameters of decision theories, which ultimately affects 
the drawn conclusions about their descriptive validity. 
If a model of stochastic choice is selected endogenously, decision theories 
generally provide the best description of observed decisions when embedded in a Fechner 
model with heteroscedastic errors drawn from a truncated distribution (e.g. Blavatskyy, 
2007). In this model, the variance of errors is higher for lotteries with a wider range of 
possible prizes. Distribution of errors is truncated so that an individual always rejects sure 
amounts below the lowest possible prize in a risky lottery and always accepts amounts 
above the highest possible prize. This stochastic choice model is so superior to other 
models that the worst performing decision theory (risk neutrality) incorporated into this 
model fits the data significantly better or at least as good as any decision theory 
embedded in any other model (except for RDEU embedded into a Fechner model with 
heteroscedastic errors).  
Which decision theory provides the best description of the data generally depends 
on the selected model of stochastic choice. For example, researchers who use a tremble 
model (e.g. Harless and Camerer, 1994) would conclude that EUT with expo-power 
utility function yields the best goodness of fit. Researchers, who use a Fechner model of 
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homoscedastic errors (e.g. Hey and Orme, 1994; Camerer and Ho, 1994) would claim 
that the most accurate description of the data is given by DAT. Last but not least, 
researchers who use a Fechner model of heteroscedastic truncated errors would conclude 
that the best decision theory is either EUT with expo-power utility function or RDEU. 
The last result confirm the finding of Buschena and Zilberman (2000) and Blavatskyy 
(2007) that EUT performs equally well as RDEU when both are incorporated in a 
Fechner model with heteroscedastic (truncated) errors. 
To draw a bottom line, an accurate description of decisions under risk relies on 
two equally important components—a model of stochastic choice and a decision theory. 
These two components are mutually dependent and generally neither can be fixed in an 
exogenous manner. However, for simple binary choices between a risky lottery and a 
sure amount, that are analyzed in this paper, the appropriate model of stochastic choice 
appears to be a Fechner model with heteroscedastic truncated errors (or a random utility 
model in a dynamic decision problem). 
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Figure 1 Timing of “bank” offers in Affari Tuoi television 
episodes before February 9, 2006 (left chart) and starting 
from February 9, 2006 (right chart) 
 
 Figure 2 Timing of “bank” offers in 
Deal or No Deal UK television episodes
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(8 boxes remain unopened)
“Bank” offers a price for contestant’s box  
(5 boxes remain unopened)
Contestant accepts the 
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“Bank” offers a price for contestant’s box  
(2 boxes remain unopened)
Contestant rejects 
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Contestant opens 
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three boxes
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Figure 3 Log-likelihood functions of EUT and YDM embedded into a tremble model 
 
